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“History is never a history only of the past. It is always concerned with the present and therefore the 
future.” 
—C.L.R. James, 1949  
 
In mid-April 1939, Cyril Lionel Robert James sat aboard a ship making its way 
from Vera Cruz to New Orleans. James was, by now, well accustomed to tropical climes. 
England had housed and nourished him for the better part of the last decade, but Trinidad 
had raised him. The southern, spring sun, which hung over the Gulf of Mexico, therefore 
had on James none of the intoxicating effects which Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
described during his similarly warm, maritime sojourn in Naples a century and a half 
earlier. Goethe had written, “In Rome I was glad to study: here I want only to live, 
forgetting myself and the world.” James, by contrast, had much to think about and the 
April sun—“hot as fire, bluish-green”—could not stop him.1    
James had recently left Mexico, where he spent two weeks in the Coyoacán 
borough of the nation’s capital with Leon Trotsky. Together with a handful of the 
Russian revolutionary’s American disciples, they discussed the objectives of the Socialist 
Workers Party, and specifically how to resolve its negligence on the “Negro Question”. 
James had only embraced Trotskyism five years earlier, but by 1939, he emerged as one 
of the leading figures in British radical circles. Once Trotsky became aware of the West 
Indian’s intellectual and oratorical gifts, he encouraged the SWP’s leadership to sponsor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 C.L.R. James to Constance Webb, undated, in Special Delivery: The Letters of C.L.R. James to Constance 
Webb, 1939-1948 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Italian Journey: 1786-1788, 
trans. W.H. Auden and Elizabeth Mayer (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), 208. 
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an American speaking tour for James. The Russian exile then invited James to Mexico 
City, hoping that together they would solve what he believed to be the missing piece of 
the revolutionary puzzle in the United States.2  
The Trinidadian showed none of the diffidence that one might expect from a 
relatively new convert before one of the masters of Marxism. In the few exchanges in 
which he disagreed with Trotsky, James did not hold back. They did not see eye to eye, 
for example, on African Americans’ inclination toward self-determination. Using the 
Garvey movement as a prism through which to analyze the question of self-
determination, James concluded that “Negroes who followed [Garvey] did not believe for 
the most part that they were really going back to Africa…but they were glad to follow a 
militant leadership.” Blacks, James thought, did not embrace Garvey predominantly 
because of a literal desire to claim their own homeland, but rather because his program 
represented a rare solace from white oppression. Trotsky, by contrast, believed that “It 
was the expression of a mystic desire for a home in which they would be free of the 
domination of whites, in which they themselves could control their own fate. That was 
also a wish for self-determination.”3 
Still, the two men found themselves in accord much more often than not. One 
conclusion, in particular, bound James to Trotsky in April 1939—and would continue to 
link them over the next decade. Writing, from the ship, to Constance “Connie” Webb, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Kent Worcester, C.L.R. James: A Political Biography (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1996), 41, 50.  
3 Breitman, Leon Trotsky on Black Nationalism and Self-Determination (New York: Pathfinder Press, 
1978), 40, 46; Trotsky’s deduction here is more aligned with that of African Americans in the Communist 
Party. Harry Haywood, one of its most prominent black leaders, later wrote: “[The Garvey movement] was 
an indigenous product, arising from the soil of Black super-exploitation and oppression in the United 
States. It expressed the yearnings of millions of Blacks for a nation of their own” (See: A Black Communist 
in the Freedom Struggle: The Life of Harry Haywood, ed. Gwendolyn Midlo Hall [Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2012], 143).  
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whom he had met three weeks earlier, and whom he would marry ten years later, James 
alluded to one point that continued to weigh on his mind as he neared New Orleans:  
I have written to Max [Shachtman] asking for a Negro column in the S.A. 
[Socialist Appeal]. No reply up to now. Patience, my dear. They will be jogged 
into action if not by me then by L.T. He is the keenest of the keen on the N 
[Negro] question. You will gasp when you read what he says to the party: (Strictly 
between us) It is roughly this: The attitude of the SWP to the N question has been 
most disquieting and unless the Party can find a way to the Negroes, i.e., to the 
most oppressed, it will degenerate. The Negroes as the most oppressed must 
become the very vanguard of the revolution.4 
This was a radical idea, one which might have led any other leftist to believe that Leon 
Trotsky had lost his mind. Having recently published the first definitive account of the 
Haitian slave rebellion, however, James was well aware of the revolutionary power of an 
oppressed black population. In England, he had welded his Pan-Africanism with his 
newly formed Marxism. Their fusion now allowed James to adopt the view that “The 
Negro represents potentially the most revolutionary section of the population.”5 When 
James arrived in the United States in October 1938, American Trotskyism had no answer 
to the “Negro Question”. When he returned in April 1939, it had, at least, a foundation 
upon which to develop one.   
In light of this, it is surprising that James scholars have largely ignored or 
dismissed any notion of the vanguard that James held and continued to hold throughout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 C.L.R. James to Constance Webb, April 1939  
5 J.R. Johnson, “Preliminary Notes on the Negro Question,” Socialist Workers Party Internal Bulletin, June 
1939. 
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his stay in America. Paul Buhle, a biographer of James, for example, suggests that while 
Trotsky viewed blacks as the vanguard, James believed they would occupy a less 
revolutionary role. This, Buhle concludes, marked a “characteristic difference” between 
the two, “destined to grow in time.”6 Christopher Hitchens, not a James scholar but 
nevertheless a journalist deeply familiar with the history of Marxism, wrote that James 
“had decided that the entire concept of a ‘vanguard party’ was at fault, no matter who 
proclaimed it.”7 Even James’ later colleague Martin Glaberman recalled that by 1944, 
James had begun “to depart from the traditional view of the vanguard party.”8  
Earlier this year, Bhaskar Sunkara, the Editor-in-Chief of Jacobin, an 
unabashedly leftist quarterly, eulogized Pete Seeger, a former member of the Communist 
Party, by writing, “It’s not that Seeger did a lot of good despite his longtime ties to the 
Communist Party; he did a lot of good because he was a communist.”9 In New Politics, 
Dan La Botz refuted Sunkara’s claim by arguing that this genre of historical analysis 
serves only to discredit contemporary Marxist critiques. This is not to suggest that 
Communists in the first half of the twentieth century did not hold progressive ideals, 
particularly regarding such issues as race and labor. Even if many American Communists 
did attempt to fight for labor and minority rights, however, they ultimately undermined 
these efforts by subordinating them to the Soviet Union’s Communist line. Rather than 
accept Sunkara’s analysis, La Botz argues, we should shed light on Marxist theory and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Paul Buhle, C.L.R. James: The Artist as Revolutionary (New York: Verso, 1988), 71. 
7 Christopher Hitchens, “C.L.R. James: Mid Off, Not Right On,” Times Literary Supplement, January 18, 
2002.  
8 Martin Glaberman, introduction to Marxism for Our Times: C.L.R. James on Revolutionary Organization 
(Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1999), xv.  
9 Bhaskar Sunkara, “In Defense of Pete Seeger, American communist,” Al Jazeera, 29 January 2014.  
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practice that remained unfettered by the directives of an oppressive, murderous, top-down 
government.10 
Much of the scholarship that dismisses James’ placement of blacks in the 
vanguard obscures the significant theoretical contribution of an avowed Marxist who 
remained bound to nothing but his own conscience and interpretation of Marxist-Leninist 
theory. James, himself, was aware of the addition that he, together with Trotsky, had 
made to the American radical landscape: “We claim particularly that our special 
theoretical contribution to the Marxist understanding of the Negro question, is that the 
Negro’s place is not at the tail but in the very vanguard of the revolutionary struggle 
against capitalism.”11 Moreover, this argument was not transient—he continued to profess 
this role of the black proletariat until the United States deported him in 1953. Following 
James’ 1948 speech “The Revolutionary Answer to the Negro Problem in US”—the last 
time James explicitly mentioned the “vanguard” prior to his deportation—Simon Owens, 
a black stamping machine operator from Detroit, recalled: “I never was so shocked and 
so happy in all my life…That was complete for me. I couldn’t see how I could even think 
of leaving the party after hearing him.”12  
 
This essay will, first, illuminate James’ conception of the vanguard. Scholars who 
have asserted his abandonment thereof have found reason to do so, and I will try to 
clarify the space between James’ philosophy and their extrapolations. The pages to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Dan La Botz, “Learn—like Seeger did—To Sing Another Tune,” New Politics, 11 February 2014.  
11 C.LR. James, “The Negro Question,” Socialist Appeal, October 17, 1939. 
12 Jacqueline Jones, A Dreadful Deceit: The Myth of Race from the Colonial Era to Obama’s America 
(New York: Basic Books, 2013), 263-4. Simon Owens is referred to, elsewhere, as Charles Denby. 	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follow also strive to shed light on the ways in which James’ philosophy remained 
disconnected from American reality. The New Deal was already an unprecedented shift 
to the left for many Americans in the 1930s, and yet James believed that a revolution 
much more radical in nature was not far off. What inspired him to think that socialism 
would take root in the United States? 
The first chapter will focus on James’ arguments for black opposition to World 
War II. By taking a stand against the United States government, James thought, African 
Americans would send a message globally that oppressed minorities were no longer 
bound to their capitalist oppressors. The second chapter will follow James to Southeast 
Missouri where, in 1942, he reported on a sharecroppers’ strike, and drafted a pamphlet 
on behalf of the black sharecroppers that called for higher wages and a solidarity with 
their white counterparts. By doing this, James proved that he had remained faithful to 
points on which he and Trotsky had agreed in 1939. Not only were black workers crucial 
to the revolutionary movement, but Trotskyists needed to work with them to bring them 
into the socialist, revolutionary movement without forcing rigid Marxist doctrine on them 
right away. The third chapter will show that James looked to the industrial scene in 1940s 
Detroit for hope that the black proletariat would assume its role in the vanguard. It will 
also attempt to explain why, despite James’ use of the term “vanguard” through 1948, 
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Chapter 1:  
Against the Arsenal of ‘Democracy’ 
 
 
“Nevertheless, if even we are agreed on the necessity of uniting the Negro masses against the 
war, many American Negroes will say: “I agree with the Socialist Workers Party that the 
15,000,000 Negroes in America have as their natural allies in the 150 million Negroes in the 
world and the millions of Indians, Burmese, Ceylonese, etc. If we all join together, that would be 
an immense force acting on a world scale. It is true that the imperialists are so hard pressed for 
men and forces that they are arming and training these millions of colonials. But nevertheless we 
remain only 15,000,000 out of a population of some 130 million people. The Africans in Africa, 
the Indians in India will be concerned with their own struggles. We wish them well. But how can 
we here struggle against the vast numbers and the great power that are opposed to us?” 
 
It is a very good question, and the answer to it brings us to the very heart of the matter.” 
 
—C.L.R. James, ‘Why Negroes Should Oppose the War,’ 1939 
 
 
C.L.R. James had not intended to stay. Following his arrival in October 1938, he 
would travel through a dozen American cities, hold forth on the decline of the British 
Empire, and promptly return to England in time for the spring start of the cricket season. 
Yet, as James proved his ability to captivate audiences, “with his graceful yet forceful 
platform style and his ability to clarify the issues on hand,” the Socialist Workers Party 
knew that it would be a mistake to let him go.13 In addition to his lecture series “Twilight 
of the British Empire,” James soon began to speak to audiences about the black struggle. 
Although he was still not thoroughly familiar with African American history, his Pan-
African background had already led him to write A History of Negro Revolt and The 
Black Jacobins, his seminal work on the Haitian Revolution. Hence, his command of 
transnational black history impressed his audiences, and particularly the African 
American listeners among them.14 During his penultimate stopover before meeting with 
Trotsky in Mexico, Socialist Appeal reported that “This was the most successful meeting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Big Phila. Meeting Opens James Tour,” Socialist Appeal, 14 January 1939, 2. 
14 “James Tour Continues With Striking Success,” Socialist Appeal, 28 January 1939, 2.  
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the Socialist Workers Party has supported here [in Fresno]. It laid the basis for party 
growth among both colored and white workers.”15 
It was natural, then, that James would fuse his knowledge of Europe and his 
strengthening grasp of the black struggle in America in his first polemical attack against 
American capitalism. Because it would take place on a global scale—and therefore attract 
global attention—James believed that the looming war would give the American working 
class a rare opportunity to galvanize international revolutionary movements. He had faith 
in the CIO’s capacity to stimulate proletarian action. James thought, however, that 
another segment of the American population was even better positioned to tap the 
revolutionary reserves of oppressed classes around the world: African Americans, and 
particularly the black proletariat. Because they had suffered the most at the hands of 
American capitalism, James believed that they would, with unrivaled fervor, challenge 
the government that maintained this system. 
 
Origins of Distrust 
James had grown contemptuous of American and Western European foreign 
policy even before he immigrated to the United States. As a member of the British 
Independent Labour Party, he had followed closely the incipient stages of conflict 
between Benito Mussolini and Stanley Baldwin, and denounced both for their imperialist 
actions in Ethiopia. Linking what he believed were the barely distinguishable aims of 
Italy and England in what was then Abyssinia, James wrote, “Musso the Monkey put his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 “Many Negroes Attend James Fresno Meeting,” Socialist Appeal, 7 March 1939, 2.   
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fingers into the fire, but the British lion has snatched the nut.”16 For James, Italian 
fascism and British ‘democratic’ capitalism represented two sides of the same imperialist 
coin. England was not alone, however, in pursuing this sort of insidious foreign policy—
the League of Nations’ culpability ran equally deep. The League had formed in the first 
place ostensibly to defend the sovereignty of nations like Ethiopia, but ended up as a 
“cloak for the machinations of Imperialism which needed some protection against the 
wide-spread horror of war and the distrust of Imperialism engendered by the war.”17 The 
western European members were in collusion, as far as James was concerned, and should 
not be trusted when they declared war for allegedly humanitarian reasons.  
From James’ vantage point, Italy, England, and the League of Nations were not 
the only villains. In the 1935 Ethiopia conflict, the American government had an 
opportunity to prove itself as a defender of democracy and the Soviet Union had a chance 
to prove that it would, consistent with its raison d’être, defend the victims of imperialist 
capitalism. Both countries not only failed to protect Ethiopia—they indirectly contributed 
to the Italian offensive. Roosevelt, technically inhibited by the Neutrality Acts to provide 
arms or assistance to either belligerent nation, nevertheless allowed American energy 
companies to continue providing oil to Italy at the height of its aggression in Ethiopia. 
The Soviet Union did the same. By the time James traveled to the U.S. in 1938, he was 
predisposed to trust neither Roosevelt nor Stalin.18  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 C.L.R. James, “Intervening in Abyssinia,” The New Leader, October 4, 1935.  
17 C.L.R. James, “I.L.P. Abyssian Policy,” Controversy: Internal Discussion Organ of the I.L.P. October 
1935.  
18 Ibid 
	   11	  
Taking up the Fight 
James began to call for African American dissent soon after he met with Trotsky 
in April. In his 1939 pamphlet “Why Negroes Should Oppose the War,” James 
constructed an extensive dialectic between the hypothetical arguments that FDR and the 
American government would make, followed by the questions and counterarguments that 
African Americans would—and should—make.  
Central to the hypothetical debate was the notion that African Americans, by 
participating in the war, would gain further acceptance into the American democratic 
system. James reminded readers that African Americans held out similar hopes during the 
First World War, when the American government sent black soldiers into war at a 
proportionally greater rate than their white counterparts. Meanwhile, army divisions 
remained segregated and African Americans received the worst compensation, housing, 
food, and medical treatment. James concluded, “This was the way in which the American 
ruling class fought side by side with Negroes in the great war for ‘democracy’…What 
happened to the Negroes, after this fine showing, should be branded on the forehead of 
any so-called Negro leader who tries to thrust them again into war.”19 Treatment of 
blacks, James recalled, was outrageous both during and after the war. They would be 
naïve to expect better should the U.S. enter intervene again. 
James did not, however, solely inveigh against the government. He recognized 
that standing up to Roosevelt and refusing to fight seemed an unimaginably daunting 
task. He thus shifted his tone: “What then is the Negro to do?”20 The task, James 
believed, was daunting primarily because African Americans comprised a racial minority, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 J.R. Johnson, “Why Negroes Should Oppose the War,” Pioneer Publishers (1939).  
20 Ibid 
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and if they planned and organized along racial lines, there would be virtually no chance 
of a successful challenge to the American government: 
Poor as the majority of Negroes are, and despised and humiliated as all of them 
are…there is a small number of Negroes who have better jobs than the others, 
who have managed to climb onto a little ledge, a little higher than the rest of their 
fellow-Negroes…They will complain, and pass resolutions, and sometimes will 
carry a case to the courts. But because they get something between fifty and 
eighty dollars a week, they are prepared to do anything that the American ruling 
class really wants them to do.21 
African Americans could assume a position in the vanguard, but they would have to fend 
off the temptation to support insurrection along racial—and not class—lines. The black 
petit bourgeoisie could be as insidious as the white, James warned, and it would be as 
capable of luring them into the war. Black workers had more in common with the victims 
of European imperialism than with the black bourgeoisie in America. Therefore, they 
should conceptualize the conflict in international, class-based terms:  
There are well over three hundred and fifty million people in India today, and the 
large majority of them are just awaiting their chance to get arms in their hands, 
drive the British imperialists into the sea, and make their country their own again. 
The same in Burma, in Ceylon, and everywhere. So that from the Atlantic Ocean 
to the Pacific, you have over five hundred million people, oppressed colonials, 
who are thinking in terms of freedom from the domination of imperialism. 
Imagine the enormous power which these colonials can exert for their own 
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emancipation in the tremendous crisis which has been loosed upon all peoples in 
the world.22 
Although this still did not explain exactly how African Americans should ignite a 
successful rebellion, it reframed the answer in a radical way. James was drawing on his 
Marxist-Leninist principles to impress a deeper sense of international solidarity upon his 
readers.   
In addition to transnational solidarity, James emphasized the importance of 
transracial solidarity within the United States. Black Americans, James argued, could not 
simply “stand aside in the coming war,” as a Pittsburgh Courier editorial had suggested 
six months earlier. As much as they would like to watch the white, capitalist superpowers 
drive one another to extinction, this was not plausible, James argued.23 He understood 
that it was only a matter of time before the American government would compel them to 
fight. The most effective way to preempt this would be the unification of black and white 
workers in a mass opposition to FDR. He was not oblivious to white workers’ frequent 
hostility toward or rejection of their black counterparts. Affiliates of the American 
Federation of Labor, for example, continued to exclude black workers even into the 
1940s.24 The AFL’s counterpart, however, the Congress of Industrial Organizations had 
demonstrated that it was among the most progressive and integrated institutions in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid 
23 J.R. Johnson, ‘The Negro Question,’ Socialist Appeal, 20 October 1939, 3; “Ringside Seat,” The 
Pittsburgh Courier, 25 March 1939.  
24 A. Philip Randolph, in whom James would soon place his confidence, chastised the AFL in December 
1941 for failing to make good on its promise of “brotherhood, freedom and democracy” by continuing to 
discriminate against black workers (See: William P. Jones, The March on Washington: Jobs, Freedom, and 
the Forgotten History of Civil Rights [New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013], 29).  
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United States. This gave James hope for a stronger coalition of black and white 
workers.25 
James concluded by reiterating a point on which he and Trotsky had agreed: 
African Americans were a crucial component of the vanguard. “In all this difficult work,” 
he wrote, “the Negroes of America must take the lead.”26 Protesting the war constituted a 
definitive first step of the revolution and it was the most direct means by which African 
Americans could demonstrate their rejection of the American capitalist system. 
 
Trotskyism and the War 
In April 1940, the Socialist Workers Party split into two factions. The group that 
kept the Socialist Workers Party name followed James Cannon, who, though he 
disapproved of Stalin, believed that the Soviet Union was still a revolutionary country, 
only mired in corrupt leadership. The other faction, now called the Workers Party, 
followed Max Shachtman and Martin Abern, who concluded that the Soviet Union 
operated not on worker-driven socialism, but rather a state-capitalist system. In spite of 
the fact that Trotsky held the former view, James gravitated toward the Shachtman-Abern 
coalition.27 
It was because of the increasingly inevitable prospect of war that this latent 
difference finally exposed itself. In its first issue of Socialist Appeal following the split, 
the SWP indicated that “The majority upheld our fundamental program for unconditional 
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26 Johnson, “Why Negroes Should Oppose the War”  
27 Farrukh Dhondy, C.L.R. James: Cricket, the Caribbean, and the World Revolution (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 2001), 22-23. 
	   15	  
defense of the Soviet Union as in no way incompatible with irreconcilable struggle for 
the overthrow of the Stalin bureaucracy.”28 The revolutionary nature of the USSR was 
still salvageable, according the Trotskyist group led by Cannon. The SWP would work to 
depose Stalin following the war, but in the meantime, it was necessary to preserve 
whatever gains made during the 1917 Revolution that remained.29 The Workers Party, led 
by Shachtman and Abern, disagreed. They argued that the Soviet Union had, in the 
process of allying itself with Germany, integrated itself among the capitalist aggressors. 
By “acting primarily as an agent of German imperialism” and “fighting a war of 
bureaucratic expansion, of subjugation and oppression of other peoples,” Russia’s 
involvement, they deemed, was reactionary. From this, it followed that “instead of the 
class consciousness of the workers being heightened, their bourgeois-patriotic feelings 
are intensified.”30 Finally, citing Gallup polls that showed an increasingly war-wary 
American public, Dwight McDonald noted a trend that the Workers Party should pay 
close attention to: “The interests of American capitalism require our participation in the 
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As Germany grew stronger and the odds of American intervention increased, 
James became even more vocal in his advocacy for black opposition to the war. By the 
summer of 1940, calls for conscription rang out across the United States. England had 
recently passed a mandatory service law in the Emergency Powers Defense Bill on May 
22, and it seemed as though the U.S. would soon follow suit.32 James was well prepared, 
as usual, to denounce the American government:  
The immediate fight is conscription. The Negroes, who more than any other 
people  in the world know what a thundering lie capitalist democracy is, must join every 
other  organized attempt of the working-class to block, impede and prevent this 
monstrous  tyranny that the capitalists want to impose on us. No conscription! Down 
with  conscription!33 
James was not alone in his outrage. The Selective Training and Service Act, ultimately 
passed in September, was the first peacetime conscription law in American history, and a 
significant number of Americans were wary of joining the ranks of Germany, the Soviet 
Union, and Japan who, over the course of the previous decade, had all enacted mandatory 
service laws of their own.34  
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34 Katznelson, Fear Itself, 310.  
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At the same time, James called for equal access to military ranks between white 
and black soldiers. Ignoring any possible contradiction between his opposition to the war 
and conscription and a demand for equal rights in the military, James vehemently 
criticized the system of class hierarchy in the army: “When the capitalist keeps the Negro 
out of the navy, does not want him to be an officer in the army, does not want him to 
learn to fly, he is carrying on the class struggle – against the Negroes in particular and the 
working class in general.”35 Here James proves theoretically inconsistent. This approach 
was realistic, but in no way radical.36 Elsewhere, James had criticized and would continue 
to criticize reformism, but that is exactly what he was advocating here. From a 
revolutionary perspective, James was wasting print space to argue for concessions, when 
he should have been using it to explain, in less abstract terms, how blacks could 
successfully oppose the war. In the “Plans for the Negro Organization” that James 
presented to Trotsky in 1939, he had written: “Are we going to attempt to patch up 
capitalism or break it? On the war question there can be no compromise.” Now, he was 
compromising.37 
James faced his second quandary as the defense industry grew. Contracts 
proliferated because the United States was preparing itself for war, one that James was 
ever-ready to condemn. The working class, however, had suffered for a decade, and it 
desperately needed whatever relief it could get. Somewhat thinly, James summarized his 
case: “So they go round and round, piling up the weapons of destruction until they are 
ready to blow the poor people on earth to pieces. But still, there are going to be jobs. And 
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37 George Breitman, ed., Leon Trotsky on Black Nationalism and Self-Determination, 58. 
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where there are going to be jobs, there the Negroes must be.”38 Nearly 11 months earlier, 
he had censured this line of thinking, when a Pittsburgh Courier editorial argued that 
African Americans should support the war lest they lose out on its lucrative side-effects. 
“The great extermination of imperialism by which Negroes were to enter into the 
promised land has now shrunk into a war to help get jobs for Negroes,” James wrote 
sarcastically. “You never know where you are with a petty-bourgeois.”39 James was  
walking a thin line in the fall of 1940, when he articulated a position that was nearly 
identical to that of the Pittsburgh Courier editorial. James would have shuddered had 
someone attached to his argument the label “petty-bourgeois,” and yet there seems to be 
little difference between the two.40  
These contradictions present us with an almost unanswerable question that could 
be asked similarly of many radicals in American history. First, did James—as an astute 
observer who probably knew that an anti-war stance was unviable—aggressively push his 
opposition arguments primarily because he hoped to expand the leftist side of this 
dialectic? Did he merely want to expose the democratic excuse for belligerence as a bald-
faced lie? If so, these contradictions would be more understandable. If, however, James 
truly believed that blacks would—and should—protest the war to the end, then he leaves 
us with an unexplainable cognitive dissonance in his call for military integration and 
access to defense industry jobs.  
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Randolph and Roosevelt 
When, in June 1939, James wrote, “The Negro must be won for socialism,” 
another, more prominent black socialist was working assiduously for the economic 
advancement of African Americans. Though not identical, the revolutionary philosophies 
of C.L.R. James and A. Philip Randolph were strikingly similar. Randolph, 11 years 
James’ senior, had used the pages of his radical publication, The Messenger, to denounce 
American entry into World War I. Moreover, like James, Randolph was contemptuous of 
both the Garvey movement and the Communist Party. It is no surprise, then, that James 
saw in Randolph the leader that the black proletariat badly needed and deserved.41  
Unlike James, Randolph had already risen to national prominence, and by the 
summer of 1940, he had Eleanor Roosevelt’s attention. Like James, Randolph wanted 
African Americans to take advantage of the booming war industry, and after he alluded to 
this at one of his Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters meetings, where the First Lady sat 
in attendance, she went to her husband and persuaded him to set up a meeting with 
Randolph.42 In September, FDR acquiesced and met with Randolph, T. Arnold Hill of the 
National Urban League and Walter White of the NAACP. The president, however, 
rejected their demand for an integrated defense industry, whereupon the civil rights 
leaders decided to take matters into their own hands. By December, Randolph had 
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developed a blueprint for the March on Washington Movement that would, he hoped, 
compel the president to agree to their terms.43 
Randolph’s decision to exclude white progressives from the movement was one 
example of a divergence with James.44 Cornelius Bynum writes that Randolph thought 
“Negroes must first ‘depend on Negroes to fight the battle of Negroes.’” Each minority, 
Randolph believed, had to pursue its own self-interest. He concluded that “If a white 
person was allowed to join the MOWM, he would gain no right he did not already 
possess before he joined.”45 James would have disagreed. Even if the white worker stood 
to gain no immediate, palpable benefit for himself, he would have taken another crucial 
step toward the solidarity between white and black workers, which would, in turn, 
increase their collective leverage. Even if blacks were in the forefront of the 
revolutionary movement, they could not carry out the revolution alone.  
Still, James continued to champion Randolph’s cause. In June 1941, he published 
a series of articles advocating mass participation in the march. In the first article of June 
9, James wrote, “The plan of a march on Washington by thousands of Negroes is one of 
the best political ideas that has appeared in this country since the war has begun.”46 
Because he focused primarily on the courage that standing up to Roosevelt would require, 
James did not preoccupy himself with the segregationist nature of the march. The precise 
means and demands were not nearly as important as the general aim of galvanizing a 
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movement against the president of a capitalist democracy. One week later, he confirmed 
this:  
Properly organized, this march will be an international event of the first 
importance. To every oppressed nationality in Europe, to a hundred million in 
Africa, to Indians and Chinese, such a march brings home precisely what the 
world situation is revolving around. Is man going to be more free or less free?47 
James’ belief in the black vanguard was front and center. As a revolutionary force, 
African Americans represented more than merely one segment of one country pushing for 
their own self-interests. These interests were undoubtedly important, but for James, they 
were secondary to the interests of the international revolutionary workers’ movement. 
Because James took this broad view of the black proletariat’s role in the global revolution 
he was bound to be disappointed when Randolph used his leverage to focus his efforts on 
what seemed to benefit African Americans—and other non-white races—alone. 
 
The Communist Party’s True Colors 
As far as James was concerned, the CPUSA had never been a true ally to anyone 
but the Comintern. In an August 1939 essay, James outlined the recent history of its 
relationship with African Americans:  
The CP passed through three stages in its Negro work: (a) up to 1928 when the 
Negro work was neglected, (b) 1929-35 when it made a drive, the period of which 
coincided with the period of [denouncing all other left currents as] social-fascism, 
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and (c) 1935-39, the open abandonment of the revolutionary line by the CP and 
the catastrophic loss of nearly all its Negro membership.48 
On August 23, 1939, eight days after James published this essay, the Soviet Union and 
German foreign ministers agreed on a non-aggression pact between the two countries. CP 
members like lawyer William L. Patterson defended this pact by asserting that it “does 
not mean that the Soviets endorse fascism any more than the signing of such a pact with 
the United States would mean that the Soviets suddenly endorsed lynching [and] Jim 
Crowism.”49 For a short while after the American Communist Party adopted a non-
interventionist approach, James and his Stalinist counterparts would use very similar 
language to malign the war.50  
 This lasted until the summer of 1941. In June, novelist and Communist Richard 
Wright embraced Randolph’s March on Washington and approached CP leaders Ben 
Davis and James Ford about writing an essay that would promote the march. Sure that 
they would share his enthusiasm, he was shocked when they scolded him and told him to 
leave politics to the Party’s leadership. On June 22, the Nazis had invaded the Soviet 
Union, and the Party line, unbeknownst to Wright, had shifted back to support of 
American intervention. In her biography of Richard Wright, Constance Webb concluded, 
“The truth was, Richard thought, the Communists had decided to abandon the pressure 
for freedom for the Negro because it might interfere with the war effort.”51 Although 
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James had already loathed Stalinists for a half-decade, this new “zigzag” only further 
reinforced James’s conviction that the Communist Party did not primarily align its 
interests with defending African Americans or any other class subordinate to the 
capitalists.  
 
A March Deferred  
When Randolph reneged on his commitment to lead a March on Washington in 
late June, James rebuked what, in his view, amounted to a capitulation to Roosevelt and 
betrayal both of African Americans and the global working class. Prior to the accord 
made between Randolph and Roosevelt, James had warned his readers of the latter’s 
“notorious tricks” referring, perhaps, to the tenuous concessions made by Roosevelt five 
months earlier. Randolph, Walter White of the NAACP, and T. Arnold Hill of the 
National Urban League had originally met with Roosevelt in the fall of 1940 to secure a 
guarantee that the president would desegregate the military and war industries. Although 
Roosevelt had rejected this proposal, he ultimately agreed, in January, to increase training 
opportunities for African Americans.52 Therefore, when Roosevelt wrote a letter to the 
Office of Production Management, calling for desegregation of the war industries, in the 
hopes of appeasing Randolph and the estimated thousands of demonstrators who would 
march on Washington, James, on June 23rd, wrote, “Now this is exactly what Roosevelt 
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has been doing to Negroes for years. And a Negro who lets that fool him is a dope; in big 
letters: D-O-P-E.”53 
So when Randolph did just that, James joined those whom he had previously 
called “radical or pseudo-radical” in denouncing Randolph, White, Crosswaith “and the 
rest in this latest action of theirs” as “stooges for the American ruling class.”54 It did not 
matter to James that Randolph had extracted an Executive Order from the President—
despite the fact it represented the first Executive Order issued on behalf of black 
Americans since Reconstruction.55 Even if James had fully digested the historical 
significance of this, he still would have found at least three faults with the boast. First, it 
had primarily racial—and not proletarian—implications. Second, these were reformist—
and not revolutionary—concessions. Third, Randolph and Roosevelt had come to an 
agreement behind relatively closed doors, which did not have the effect that a mass 
demonstration would have had. A deal reached by phone could not fill the pages of an 
international press with pictures of thousands of revolutionary African Americans voicing 
their opposition against an oppressive, capitalist government.  
A week later, James still had not finished with Randolph and his collaborators. He 
fulminated: “The worst traitors and enemies are always the traitors and enemies inside 
the camp. Today at the head of the traitors is Philip Randolph with his two assistants, 
Walter White of the NAACP and Frank Crosswaith of the Socialist Party.”56 That White 
would succumb did not surprise James, who had disparaged the NAACP in the past and, 
in his article of July 14th, recapitulated his belief that the organization’s allegiance to the 
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government took precedence over its allegiance to African Americans. That Randolph, on 
the other hand, gave in struck a more serious blow to James’ confidence in the rise of the 
working class in a common struggle against Roosevelt. Randolph, unlike NAACP 
leaders, had never represented bourgeois interests in the first place. Rather, James 
lamented, “Randolph had organized the Pullman porters, the best labor organization that 
Negroes have today. The struggles of Negroes are first and foremost labor struggles, 
particularly the struggle for jobs in the war industries. So everybody looked to 
Randolph.”57 
 
James was likely bound to be disappointed with the March on Washington’s 
results from the beginning. Its authors had not intended to wield the threat of a mass 
march as a revolutionary tool. Rather, Roosevelt and White had a specific set of 
objectives that the march would achieve.  
For Randolph, and especially not for White, the March was not primarily a step toward 
revolution. Although Randolph believed that it would have wider rippling effects, his 
principal objective was to see the end of discrimination against blacks in the military and 
wartime industries.58 James was too busy considering the potentially international 
consequences of the March on Washington to focus on what Randolph would do if 
Roosevelt acquiesced to his specific demands. 
James’ program of African American opposition to the war died with Randolph’s 
decision to cancel the March on Washington. Although he held out hope that another 
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group of African Americans would coalesce and resume the work that Randolph had 
started, the United States—African Americans included—had come to accept a potential 
American intervention. James would have to look elsewhere for the revolutionary spark 
that he was still sure could be found in America. A few weeks after Randolph called the 
march off, James had nursed his wounds and was ready to reenter the ring: “[Roosevelt] 
has won the first found in the fight. Without Randolph and White he couldn’t have won. 


















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 J.R. Johnson, “Negro Protest Runs Too Deep to Be Squashed,” Labor Action, July 21, 1941, 4. 
	   27	  
Chapter 2:  
‘Down with the Starvation Wages in South-East Missouri’ 
	  
Take the following dialogue. A farmer is asked if he isn’t concerned about the fear that Hitler may bomb 
his house.   
 “That shack!” he replies with scorn. “That shack should have been bombed 50 years ago.” 
 “But the bomb may kill you.” 
 “What does it matter? I get six bits a day, when I work.” 
  - C.L.R. James, ‘What Is It the Sharecropper Fights For?’, 29 September 1941 
 
Three months had yet to pass when James found more fertile, revolutionary 
ground. In Mississippi County, Missouri, sharecroppers continued to protest the mass 
evictions that white landowners had issued for nearly two years. Taking advantage of the 
chinks in the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s armor, these landowners had begun to reduce 
their labor, leaving thousands of former tenants without homes and land to farm. They 
attributed sharecropper layoffs to increased mechanization, and subsequently began to 
rely more heavily on wage workers and tractors than on sharecroppers who rented land 
and equipment from them.60  
Since the mid-1930s, several unions had, with varying degrees of success, 
insinuated themselves into the sharecropper cause. Black and white farmers, between 
1937 and 1942, turned at various times to the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union (STFU), 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and its affiliate, the United Cannery and 
Allied Packers and Agricultural Workers of America (UCAPAWA). These organizations, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For a lucid history of the sharecroppers in southeast Missouri, see: Jared Roll, Spirit of Rebellion: Labor 
and Religion in the New Cotton South (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010). 
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however, had difficulties attracting and retaining the sharecroppers’ allegiances largely 
due to the incompetent or precarious support they offered the destitute farmers.61  
Thus, in September of 1941, James began to apply his socialist remedy to the 
Missouri sharecroppers’ plight. Not technically part of the Jim Crow south, Missouri 
nevertheless had enough in common with neighboring Arkansas, Tennessee, and 
Kentucky that success there might spread across its southern borders. Moreover, these 
sharecroppers had garnered national attention since the early stages of evictions. A 
triumphant campaign, James hoped, would galvanize oppressed farmers throughout the 
southern United States. 
James’ engagement with the Missouri sharecroppers began in the fall of 1941 and 
would culminate in the spring of 1942. This experience shaped his formulation of the 
revolutionary forefront in two ways. First, it began to show him the corruptible, 
bureaucratic elements of organized labor. Two years earlier, James had praised the CIO 
as a revolutionary force. Throughout the strike—and particularly at the local level—it 
would occasionally exhibit this potential. It also, however, manifested some of the 
negative tendencies that James would later come to despise. Second, the sharecroppers’ 
strike persuaded James that black laborers remained crucial to the revolutionary 
vanguard.   
 
Radicalism and the South 
The southern United States had been on the radical left’s radar for more than 
twenty years. As early as 1919, Russia’s political leaders, operating through the 
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Communist International, had begun to look for foreign outposts of revolutionary 
activity.62 The American South, with its scant unions and industry, and its internationally 
notorious oppression of African Americans, appeared to be a promising place to start. 
The Comintern therefore invited Southern African Americans to travel to Moscow in 
order to learn about the tenets of Communism. This opened a dialogue between black 
America and Communist Russia that would last more than two decades.63 
Disagreements regarding African American self-determination added to the early 
turbulence both within American Communist organizations and within the Third 
International. Although he initially viewed self-determination as “far-fetched and not 
consonant with American reality,” Harry Haywood, in an illuminating example of the 
Russian influence on American Communists, was soon convinced that this was the best 
solution for African Americans after all. N. Nasanov, a Russian Communist, persuaded 
Haywood that blacks comprised an oppressed nation within the United States. Haywood 
coupled this insight with the response of many African Americans to Garveyism, and 
decided that the Communist Party should harness this energy rather than allow another 
“Back to Africa” movement to rise from the ashes.64 Joseph Stalin, crucially, supported 
self-determination. Therefore, despite the fact that other black Americans—including 
Haywood’s brother Otto Hall, who called this “criminally stupid”—protested, the 
Comintern officially adopted the line of self-determination.65  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Also referred to as the Comintern and Third International 
63 Glenda Gilmore, Defying Dixie, 30-57. 	  
64 Harry Haywood, A Black Communist in the Freedom Struggle: The Life of Harry Haywood, ed. 
Gwendolyn Midlo Hall (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 138-143. 
65 Glenda Gilmore, Defying Dixie, 30-57. 
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By the fall of 1941, when he began to advocate for a sharecroppers’ strike in 
Southeast Missouri, James had already decided that self-determination was among the 
least effective channels of African American and proletarian empowerment. This did not, 
however, prevent him from sharing the Comintern view that southern, agrarian African 
Americans represented a revolutionary segment of the United States. In his first report on 
the strike, James wrote that “Despite the most vicious exploitation, despite terror—yes, 
actual, real terror—and despite starkest oppression, these are men whose spirits have not 
been broken, who stand ready to fight with every worker against class tyranny.”66 
Although the Declaration of Independence’s promise of equality was illusory throughout 
the United States, nowhere was it more so than in the South.  
 
Failed Support 
James did not travel to Missouri right away. He remained in New York 
throughout the fall of 1941, where he began to report remotely on the sharecroppers’ 
plight. In a series of articles which James wrote for Labor Action between September 22nd 
and October 6th, he sketched a short history of the sharecroppers’ clash with the white 
landowners, and outlined the inefficacies of the local and federal institutions that should 
have assisted the sharecroppers. Much like the Bolsheviks who exempted themselves 
from any serious involvement in the provisional government following the February 
Revolution, and who therefore attacked it without inviting any blame for failed 
governance, James could assail the government’s miscues in Missouri without being 
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criticized for any hypothetical steps he would have taken had he been there over the 
previous two years—and had he been in a position of power.  
James launched his first attack on the Agricultural Adjustment Act, a staple of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. On September 22, 1941, he wrote, “To enrich the soil 
one third of the crop was to be plowed under and soil conservation payments were made 
to the landlord, providing that the money advanced by the government should be shared 
by the farmer. On paper it was beautiful.”67 Indeed, the AAA seemed to be an ingenious 
piece of legislation. The government would pay farmers not to plant parts of their crop, 
which would curb surplus, and increase the value of the crops they did plant. The law, 
however, was riddled with flaws that the Roosevelt Administration had not foreseen. 
Among those, James highlighted the one that had a particularly significant impact on 
sharecroppers: 
By 1938 the landlord calculated that if he had no tenant farmers and no 
sharecroppers he would not have to divide the government’s subsidy with 
anybody. The sharecropper’s contract is from January to December, and in 
January 1939 the landlords in southeast Missouri gave notice to the sharecroppers 
to vacate by January 10.68 
It was not enough that the government had established a subsidy that was, by mandate, to 
be shared between the landowner and the sharecropper. Because the Roosevelt 
Administration did not enforce this, and because it did not hold local authorities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 J.R. Johnson, “Sharecroppers Fight Poverty & Oppression,” 3.  
68 Ibid; As Jared Roll points out, the Roosevelt Administration passed a second iteration of the AAA 
following the United States v. Butler decision that ruled the AAA of 1933 unconstitutional. Although the 
government designed the AAA of 1938 such that it would prevent the kind of manipulation that James 
alluded to, the legislation nevertheless retained substantial flaws that allowed landowners to take advantage 
of their tenants. Either James was not aware of the passage of a second AAA or he conflated the AAA of 
1933 and that of 1938 due to their similar deficiencies.  
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accountable, it was complicit in the ongoing exploitation of sharecroppers. James was not 
about to give FDR the benefit of the doubt, and the perceived failure of the AAA had 
provided him yet another reason to distrust the federal government. 
James also found fault with the locally prominent preacher and sharecropper 
Owen Whitfield. Whitfield, who had farmed in Mississippi County since 1923, joined the 
newly formed Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union in 1936, after one of its representatives, 
Rev. Claude Williams, held a meeting at Whitfield’s church in Deventer. The black 
pastor soon emerged as one of the union’s most charismatic leaders, and, bearing this 
responsibility, he began to agitate on behalf of the sharecroppers in Mississippi County. 
In 1937, the STFU appointed him a part-time organizer in Missouri, which outraged the 
ousted organizer John Handcox who warned that Whitfield would not be able to 
simultaneously fulfill his duties as a pastor, farm, and organize sharecroppers. 69 
James was aware of Whitfield’s leadership abilities. He credited the Missourian 
with carrying out a roadside demonstration that the STFU had planned and the evicted 
sharecroppers executed three years earlier. Calling the demonstration “a complete 
success” and “a landmark in the history of the class struggle in America,” James was 
undeniably pleased with Whitfield’s potential as a revolutionary leader. Nevertheless, 
Whitfield’s recent political maneuvers had left a bad taste in James’ mouth. In the midst 
of a senatorial campaign, Missouri Governor Lloyd Stark reached out to Whitfield, 
hoping to dissuade him from organizing another demonstration.70 Stark, promising 10,000 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Roll, Spirit of Rebellion, 100-111. 
70 Stark’s opponent in the senatorial race was the future president Harry Truman, who promised to alter 
federal subsidy laws to prevent further mass evictions. When, however, white landowners refuted the 
notion that the demonstrators were evicted tenants, both Stark and Truman backed away from their prior 
support (See: Donald H. Grubbs, Cry from Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union and the New 
Deal [Chapel Hill: University Press of North Carolina, 1971], 181-2).  
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houses and ten acres of land for each sharecropping family, had attempted to coerce John 
Moore, a black leader in the Missouri Agricultural Workers Council, to drop the idea for 
a demonstration prior to meeting with Whitfield. When Moore refused, Governor Stark, 
undeterred, “got hold of Whitfield at the Park Plaza Hotel, having paid all his expenses 
back from his tour, with cigars included. Where Moore had held firm, Whitfield 
capitulated and agreed to call off the projected demonstration.” Furthermore, instead of 
the 10,000 houses and ten acres of land that were to comprise La Forge Farms, the 
government had, by September 1941, only furnished the sharecroppers with 500 houses, 
with access to a meager three-quarters of an acre each.71  
Recounting Whitfield’s capitulation, James must have experienced a painful 
feeling of déjà vu. Like Randolph, Whitfield had had a propitious opportunity to place 
better demands before the government and like Randolph, he negotiated, James thought, 
too quickly.  
 
The Leftist Landscape in Southeast Missouri  
James was far from the only leftist on the ground when he arrived in Missouri in 
1942. He meditated on them less than on Whitfield and La Forge, but he was nevertheless 
aware of the political alliances in the sharecroppers’ strike prior to his departure for 
Missouri. He knew of the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union (STFU), for example, formed 
in 1934. He was slightly more familiar with the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, 
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and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA), into which “the Stalinists of the CIO 
demanded as a condition that the strikers enter.”72 With these forces already entrenched in 
the tenants’ labor movement, what could James offer that the STFU, CIO, and 
UCAPAWA could not?  
First, the STFU’s impact in the Bootheel had significantly diminished. Ever since 
1938, when it had failed to attenuate the first round of evictions, the union grew 
increasingly subservient to the UCAPAWA, an outgrowth of the CIO, founded by 
Donald Henderson in 1937. Although initially reluctant to withdraw from the STFU, 
local activists gradually shifted their allegiance to the larger, more robust CIO, and by 
extension the UCAPAWA. Moreover, Henderson expelled the STFU from the 
UCAPAWA in February 1937, leaving its members the choice to join his union or remain 
in the enfeebled STFU. Whitfield, who had worked with both the STFU and UCAPAWA 
in the previous few years, aimed to fill the void left by a crippled STFU, and thus helped 
form the Missouri Agricultural Workers’ Council (MAWC). It is plausible that the 
consolidation of trade unions would have made James’ efforts unnecessary. Had one, 
unified negotiating force presented itself as a cohesive and competent opponent to the 
white landowners, the local sharecroppers might not have felt compelled to turn to an 
outside voice. Instead, because these unions remained splintered and because they 
answered to different leadership, James would find space to inject his own agenda—at 
least in part.73 
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The War’s Impact on Labor 
If John L. Lewis’ resignation as president of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations in November 1941 had signaled an increasingly hawkish CIO, the Nazi 
invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 further confirmed this trend. Although the CIO 
was not a Communist Party front organization, Communists filled its ranks. Reflecting 
the Communist Party’s about-face concerning a U.S. intervention in the war, the CIO’s 
Communists began to call for support for FDR’s interventionist program. The majority of 
the labor movement now held this view, and the ensuing months saw a decline in dissent 
within the CIO.74 
Whitfield refused to genuflect before the Roosevelt Administration so easily. 
Even after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, the pastor focused more on the 
war’s implications for negotiating leverage than on the need for farm laborers to stand 
behind Roosevelt. His correspondence with Washington officials took on a tone of 
admonition rather than one of support, warning that African Americans, without better 
treatment, would become increasingly radicalized. In some ways, Whitfield’s calls for 
labor strikes became more frequent and intense in the ensuing months.75  
 
Laboratory for the Cotton South 
Such was the scene when James arrived in 1942. Although accounts vary 
regarding the exact timeline of his stay in the Bootheel, James found himself in Missouri 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at Home: The CIO in World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 42, 64. 
75 Erik S. Gellman and Jarod Roll. The Gospel of the Working Class: Labor’s Southern Prophets in New 
Deal America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011), 122. 
	   36	  
no later than April of 1942.76 On April 18, H.L. Mitchell, a co-founder of the STFU, 
wrote to his colleague J.E. Clayton:  
There is some trouble brewing up there and around Sikeston. Whitfield doesn’t 
seem to be doing anything but some Negro who is a Trotskyite communist has 
been in there and is trying to get something started for UCAPAWA.77 
Indeed, James had met with local union activists in the hopes of launching another strike. 
Seizing on Whitfield’s notion that cotton choppers—among other farm laborers—had 
gained leverage since the attack on Pearl Harbor, James decided to publish a pamphlet 
that would articulate the farmers’ grievances, desires, and strategy. The pamphlet, 
entitled ‘Down with the Starvation Wages in South-East Missouri,’ expressed the 
farmers’ three priorities in very simple terms: 30 cents an hour for ten hours of daily 
labor; 45 cents for tractor drivers; and time and a half for overtime. Echoing James’ 
earlier denunciations of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the pamphlet stated, “The 
Government said it would help the croppers through the A.A.A. The landlord made us 
into day laborers and stole the money we should have got.”78 This specific reference to 
the AAA served to remind the farmers and unionists that the government and the New 
Deal had largely failed them. Whereas many African Americans appreciated FDR for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 In Kent Worcester’s chronology, the strike that James supported took place in May 1941. This strike did 
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benefits he had extended to them since 1933, compared to halfhearted efforts of previous 
presidents, this pamphlet reinforced the argument that the Roosevelt Administration had 
not done all that it could.79 
If farmers wanted to gain these concessions, they had to follow the pamphlet’s 
most basic prescription:  
To win these demands is simple. You must join the union. The old locals must be 
revived. New locals must be formed. If even you haven’t a charter, call a meeting, 
write for a charter, saying you will pay afterwards, and begin to function like a 
local. All you have to do is to get in contact with Local No. 313, Lilbourn, South 
Delmo Project. The U.C.A.P.A.W.A. gave us full authority to fight and if need be 
strike to raise our wages. Bring everybody from your district in.80 
Given the UCAPAWA’s Communist affiliations, why would James approve of such a 
statement, much less transcribe it? Even if he was willing to collaborate with non-
Trotskyist organizations, his open-mindedness surely stopped short of collaboration with 
Stalinists. It is therefore likely that both James and the Local No. 313 considered this 
pamphlet a break with the UCAPAWA national leadership, because, in fact, Donald 
Henderson had given them no such authority. A Communist, Henderson supported the 
wartime no-strike pledge that CIO members had offered to Roosevelt. In light of this 
allegiance to the American government—and to the Comintern—Henderson counseled 
the MAWC to seek alternative channels by which to increase wages for farm laborers. He 
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suggested, for example, that the council turn to Missouri representatives, like the 
Southern Democrat Orville Zimmerman. This was unsuccessful, however, and Henderson 
therefore advised the Local 313 to formulate a pamphlet listing the unionists’ demands. 
Even though the Local 313, with James’ help, ultimately did this, they were also intent on 
launching a strike, which Henderson had forbidden.81 
The pamphlet raised the race issue next. Given that the subscript on the 
pamphlet’s title page read ‘White and Colored Together’—and that the next page 
declared, in bold, ‘Black and White Unite and Fight!’—confronting this was inevitable. 
A section entitled ‘To the White Workers Especially’ called for white farm laborers to 
join forces with their black brethren. It stated:  
Brothers, you are workers just like we are. The landlords tell you not to join 
because we are Black. What we want is to unite with you in the union. Don’t you 
want 30c an hour just like us? You want it as much as we want it. If we only join 
together and fight the landlords together, they will have to pay.82 
As contemptuous as he was of the UCAPAWA’s Stalinist strains, James appreciated its 
integrationist efforts. The increasingly hawkish—and therefore complaisant—CIO was 
not capable of leading the sharecropper protest movement. Since its inception in 1935, 
however, it had demonstrated that it was willing—more than any other labor movement, 
at least—to join white and black Americans in a strong, integrated workers’ coalition.83 
James had foreseen the importance of this solidarity in his meeting with Trotsky, even 
though the Russian revolutionary remained skeptical of white workers in the U.S. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Roll, Spirit of Rebellion,166-67.  
82 “Down with the Starvation Wages in South-East Missouri” 
83 Ira Katzelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time, 175. 
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pamphlet, in the spirit of Trotsky, placed the burden of unification on the African 
American sharecroppers. It was the black proletariat—not the white—that had to agitate 
for transracial solidarity.  
This was not the first time that black farmers implored whites to join them in their 
common cause against the landowners. As little credit as James gave to Whitfield, the 
pastor had, four years earlier, told poor whites “you and I must unite for a higher standard 
of living through collective efforts and we can better our condition.”84 On this point of 
class solidarity, James would have agreed with him.  
 
Recalling Mexico  
In his brief discussion of James’ stay in southeastern Missouri, Paul Buhle, a 
preeminent historian of American Marxism and James scholar, calls James’ views of the 
peasantry—referring to the sharecroppers—“unusual”.85 Yet, James’ interest in black 
sharecroppers, and his decision to travel to Missouri to engage with them, follows 
naturally from his discussions with Trotsky in Mexico. James had said:  
The danger of our advocating and injecting a policy of self-determination is that it 
is the surest way to divide and confuse the workers in the South. The white 
workers have centuries of prejudice to overcome, but at the present time many of 
them are working with the Negroes in the Southern sharecroppers’ union and with 
the rise of the struggle there is every possibility that they will overcome their 
agelong prejudices. But for us to propose that the Negro have this black state for 
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himself is asking too much from the white workers, especially when the Negro 
himself is not making the same demand.86 
 
 
(C.L.R. James Papers, Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript 
 Collections) 
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As early as April 1939, James recognized the revolutionary potential of southern 
sharecroppers. In order to fulfill this potential, he believed it was necessary for whites 
and blacks to work together, and although he ultimately supported the right to black self-
determination, he thought it would be counterproductive if African Americans did not 
seek it themselves. They could, instead, serve a more important role within an integrated 
culture by inciting whites to work alongside them along class lines. This is precisely 
what, in May 1942, he helped the black Bootheel sharecroppers articulate in their 
pamphlet.  
Another important contribution James made at the meeting in Mexico resurfaced 
in his advocacy in Missouri. He had told Trotsky,  
In regard to the question of socialism in the agitational organ, it is my view that 
the organization should definitely establish itself as doing the day-to-day work of 
the Negroes in such a way that the masses of Negroes can take part in it before 
involving itself in discussions about socialism.87 
H.L. Mitchell had distinguished James as a “Trotskyite communist,” but James’ brand of 
socialism is not actually apparent in the pamphlet. Portions of the pamphlet even 
demonstrate that he was willing to undermine certain tenets of Marxism-Leninism in 
order to most accurately capture the tone of the local unionists.88 The pamphlet, for 
example, devoted a section entirely to local preachers. It stated:  
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All the preachers must get their flock together and preach to them about the union 
and solidarity in the struggle. If a preacher is not with us he is against us. That is 
the Voice of Scripture. Also the Laborer is worthy of his hire. That is Scripture 
also. We are worthy of 30c an hour. God helps those who help themselves. That is 
Scripture too. Solidarity in the Union, that is the way to get the Kingdom of 
Heaven upon Earth.89 
At first glace, it seems impossible that a true Marxist-Leninist would have written these 
words. There are two explanations for this, however. First, the pamphlet was not about 
proselytizing on behalf of Marxism. Instead, it was a fulfillment of James’ idea that to 
gain African Americans’ trust, Trotskyists had to assist them without demanding a strict 
adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. (As if to further justify James’ approach, Donald 
Henderson effectively alienated the unionists precisely because they suspected that he 
had prioritized the Communist line instead of the strikers’ interests.90) Second, James had 
acknowledged in his discussions with Trotsky that the SWP ‘Negro Organization’ should 
ally itself with any organization that had an authentic interest in black empowerment. 
Under “Practical Steps” of “Plans for the Negro Organization,” James first declared that 
the SWP would “Mobilize a national campaign with every conceivable means of united 
front: AFL, CIO, SP, SWP, Negro churches, bourgeois organizations and all.”91 This, of 
course, did not mean that the black vanguard would sacrifice its goals in order to appease 
religious organizations. It should, however, be willing to bring them into the movement 
provided they appear willing and able to learn from and assist the proletariat.  
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Conclusion 
Following the meeting in May, 8,000 laborers went on strike. Despite 
Henderson’s denunciations of the strike leaders, they proceeded with the support of the 
St. Louis CIO Industrial Union Council. In July, the strikers won their demands.92 
Furthermore, although the majority of the strikers were black, some local white farm 
laborers had joined the cause.93 James was not single-handedly responsible for this 
victory, but his own contribution seemed to legitimize the tactics he proposed to Trotsky 
in April 1939. African Americans, together with an unrelenting local union, had called 
for and organized a successful strike against the white capitalist elite, and had enlisted 
white farm laborers to cooperate along class lines. 
Still—and especially in light of his later criticisms of the CIO, discussed in the 
following chapter—one must ask whether the strike was truly revolutionary, and if James 
held himself to the same standard that he held A. Philip Randolph, and later, the CIO’s 
leaders. Before the strike, farm workers in the Bootheel earned $1.25 daily, and by 
strike’s end, they had negotiated a daily wage between two and three dollars. This wage 
increase probably made a noticeable change in the day-to-day lives of the farm workers. 
It did not, however, offer a revolutionary answer to a farm labor landscape that saw 
tenants turn increasingly into wage laborers. James nevertheless concluded a year later: 
“[In Missouri] we could actually affect the lives of the workers. Since the strike in 1942, 
every worker in Missouri works ten hours a day and then goes home. Nothing will make 
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him work longer.”94 Unfortunately, James did not stick around long enough to see Orville 
Zimmerman—the same Congressman to whom Henderson had suggested the farm 
workers bring their grievances—gut the funding that the Farm Security Administration 
had provided for homes for Bootheel farmers in 1943 and 1944. In May 1944, one 
Southeast Missourian wrote to Labor Action, “Things haven’t changed very much on the 
farms today.”95  
James’ work in Southeast Missouri is important for at least one other reason. 
Nowhere on the pamphlet did the sharecroppers, through James, make any reference to 
the Workers Party. Furthermore, James was known among the sharecroppers as ‘Brother 
Williams’; he did not go by his name or any one of his many journalistic pseudonyms. 
These are not signs of a party or a revolutionary leader who saw themselves in a top-
down, centralized, ‘vanguard party’. At first glance, this would seem to vindicate the 
common argument that James resented—or, at least, ignored—the legacy of strong 
organization both in Leninist and Trotskyist thought. James did, however, understand the 
value—and even vitality—of organization, the proof of which lies in his cooperation with 
and promotion of the Local 313. It just did not need to come from the ‘party’. Moreover, 
the Workers Party remained equally aware of organization’s role, while simultaneously 
not usurping power and posterity for itself. A Labor Action report from July 13, 1942 
stated, “This is a landmark in the history of Missouri, and Local 313, which has led the 
whole fight, deserves above all to receive the rewards of their courage, their 
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determination and their splendid leadership.”96 James would later qualify this by 
suggesting that both “Local 313 and the Trotskyites have credit for this,” but he wrote 
this for a specifically Trotskyist audience.97 By this stage, it seems, James had already 
resigned himself to the idea that neither he nor the Workers Party lead the revolution. 
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Chapter 3:  
The Portent of Motor City  
 
“The backwardness and humiliation of the Negroes that shoved them into these industries, is the very thing 
which today is bringing them forward, and they are in the very vanguard of the proletarian movement from 
the very nature of the proletarian struggle itself. Now, how does this complicated interrelationship, this 
‘Leninist’ interrelationship express itself? Henry Ford could write a very good thesis on that if he were so 
inclined.”  
—C.L.R. James, “The Revolutionary Answer to the Negro Problem in the United States,” 1948 
 
Detroit was thriving. The war, which James had ceaselessly condemned, 
continued to elevate the city to prosperous heights. Unions, it seemed, commanded at last 
the respect and clout they deserved, and thousands of migrant African Americans were 
finding better employment and housing than they had previously known in the South. 
This was the Detroit that many mid-century Americans saw through their rose-colored 
glasses. James was not among them.   
As early as April 1941—even before trumpeting the MOWM’s virtues and 
embarking for Missouri—James began to grasp the importance of the Motor City. Detroit 
was, on one hand, home to the nation’s robust automobile companies. On the other, it 
generated some of the most combustible racial tension in the United States. While he 
waited for America to realize its revolutionary potential, James turned to Detroit both for 
an example of the Roosevelt administration’s most acute failures and for evidence of the 
revolutionary movement’s progress in spite of these failures. Although James found the 
outbreaks of violence against African Americans abhorrent, he reveled in the belief that 
they foretold revolution. In James’ view, the state-sponsored violence against blacks, 
epitomized in the 1943 riots, was approaching a level of oppression so overtly 
hypocritical—in light of America’s war against German racial supremacy—that African 
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Americans would be pushed further into the vanguard. Conversely, the 1940s labor 
landscape in Detroit forced James to confront the increasingly enervate nature the CIO. 
Between 1943 and 1953, when the U.S. finally deported him, James found in Detroit both 
a portrait of America’s past and present and a herald of its future.    
 
Bolstering the UAW-CIO 
As A. Philip Randolph was preparing to bring his mass movement to FDR’s 
doorstep, the United Auto Workers (UAW) was beginning to wage its own proletarian 
battle 500 miles away in Detroit. Aware of its still tenuous negotiating power with 
Detroit’s auto companies, the union grasped the urgency of securing collective bargaining 
rights, which were anathema to Ford. The UAW-CIO was also aware that it needed the 
allegiance of black workers in order to launch a successful strike in the hopes of 
obtaining these rights. Now, the union had only to convince them that their fates were 
intertwined.98  
Like many radicals, James had long known this. He was, however, was unusually 
ambivalent about who would lead the charge against the capitalist oppressor, represented 
in this case by Ford. Both in Missouri and throughout the country, blacks were—and 
knew themselves to be—the most exploited class of the population. Therefore they had, 
according to James, the most revolutionary potential. In the Ford plants, however, this 
was not so obvious.  
In the wake of World War I, Henry Ford revolutionized American industry. He 
had already established himself as a leader in American automobile manufacturing, but as 
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early as the 1920s, he began to dissolve traditional racial divides in industry and became 
one of the largest employers of African Americans in the United States. Ford made a tacit 
compact—a “bond of interdependency,” as Beth Tompkins Bates calls it—with black 
Detroit. By 1940, African Americans comprised almost 12 percent of Ford employees 
and half of all black laborers in the automobile industry nationwide worked for Ford.99  
Henry Ford’s stature did not elude James. In American Civilization, he would 
write that the age of Ford represented the second of two globally significant epochs of 
American history. “Washington and Henry Ford,” he wrote, “are the symbols of 
American civilization.”100 Moreover, James was acutely aware of Ford’s appeal among 
African Americans. He understood the persuasive force of Donald Marshall and other 
black ministers like Father Everard W. Daniel, who served Ford in black communities 
almost as faithfully as they served God. Daniel, for example, in response to an anti-Ford 
speech given by A. Philip Randolph, asked if anyone could “show him an industrialist 
who has done more for colored labor than Henry Ford.”101 While James found this line of 
argument only superficially sound, it did not prevent him from seething that “Ford is one 
of the most dangerous enemies of labor who exist in this country.”102 He knew that Ford’s 
roots were firmly planted in black Detroit, which would make it all the more difficult to 
tear them out of American society. 
The UAW, by contrast, had failed to endear itself to Detroit’s black proletariat. 
Theoretically and rhetorically, the union did not discriminate against African Americans, 
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but its actions, throughout the latter half of the 1930s, often spoke louder than its words. 
As August Meier points out, the UAW did little to mitigate racial discrimination in the 
auto plants, and it promoted a negligible number of black workers to elective and staff 
positions.103  
Beth Tompkins Bates further underlines a residual apprehension among African 
Americans toward unions on account of the AFL’s discriminatory past. Compared to the 
AFL, the CIO and its affiliate, the UAW, were still young and less prominent. Bates 
suggests that blacks, therefore, considered the UAW “guilty of racism until it could prove 
itself innocent through new practices.” This explains, then, why many black workers 
were initially hesitant to join the UAW’s mission to organize Ford in 1940 and 1941.104  
Trotsky would have been sympathetic to this view. “But today,” he told his 
American colleague Arne Swabeck in 1933, “the white workers in relation to the Negroes 
are the oppressors, scoundrels, who persecute the black and the yellow, hold them in 
contempt and lynch them.” He continued, “I am absolutely sure that [the Negroes] will in 
any case fight better than the white workers.”105 James was more conciliatory toward the 
white labor class. He believed that whatever hostility white workers had shown toward 
black workers was not rooted in some innate chauvinism. Instead, factory owners or 
landowners had turned white and black laborers against one another in order to maintain 
a weak labor opposition. By using different wage scales for different races, capitalists 
reinforced the notion of white superiority among the workers. James believed that the 
role of the Trotskyists was to open both white and black workers’ eyes to these tactics. 
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Unified, they could both earn more even than white workers had until now “or overthrow 
the system altogether.”106 
Another possible explanation for this difference between Trotsky and James is 
that James began to form his ideas about the American revolutionary movement in 1938, 
after the CIO split from the AFL. The CIO, unlike the AFL, had taken steps to integrate 
the labor movement. Trotsky, in 1933, only had the AFL by which to assess the labor 
landscape in the United States.  
Still, James grew impatient with black Ford employees for their hesitation. Like 
many black UAW organizers, James failed to understand how African Americans could 
pass up the chance to join a robust, working class movement:  
The Negroes, despite their grievances, must take sides instantaneously with the 
union  against Ford. Any Negro who attempts to scab will deserve all he gets. 
This is no time for counting and rehashing what has been done and what ought to 
have been brought in.107 
James was equally firm with the UAW-CIO, however. He understood that the black 
workers at FMC were “anti-union” because their conditions at the company seemed 
better than anything the union could offer them. The unions, James wrote, “must see to it 
not only that Negroes are invited to join the union. That is not enough. They must 
convince the Negroes that they can look to the union for active concern about jobs for 
Negroes.”108  
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The successful UAW-organized strike in April 1941 ultimately proved the 
strength of a symbiotic relationship between black workers and organized labor. Since 
the fall of 1940, leaders of the National Negro Congress (NNC) and the NAACP had 
begun to advocate on behalf of the UAW in Detroit, despite the fact that the UAW had 
only half-heartedly advocated on behalf of black workers.109 August Meier and Elliott 
Rudwick reaffirm this by writing that the UAW’s president R.J. Thomas told the union’s 
annual convention that they owed Detroit’s black leaders a “great debt” for joining the 
black workers with the UAW, a solidarity which was crucial to the strike’s success.110 
 
The Sojourner Truth Conflict and its Aftermath 
James had more than just unions on his mind, for he understood that more 
afflicted African Americans than what they experienced on the factory floor. On 
February 28, 1942, several black families moved into the newly opened Sojourner Truth 
housing project in the Seven Mile-Fenelon neighborhood of northeast Detroit. The 
Detroit Housing Commission and the United States Housing Association had drawn up 
plans for the two-hundred-unit housing project the previous year, and in doing so, incited 
deep resentment among the white residents of the Seven Mile-Fenelon neighborhood. 
Following a series of protests,  federal officials and the Detroit Housing Commission 
briefly decided to place white residents in the Sojourner Truth project, before finally 
designating it a home for black war workers. When, in February 1942, these black 
families moved in, fights broke out between the black and white crowds that had gathered 
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outside of the project. This altercation resulted in forty people injured, 220 arrested, and 
109 in custody awaiting trial. The vast majority of these were black.111 
A little over a year after the Sojourner Truth clash, Detroit experienced what 
Thomas Sugrue calls “one of the worst riots in twentieth-century America.”112 For three 
days, beginning on June 20, whites and blacks clashed, resulting in 34 deaths, 433 
injuries, two million dollars worth of property damage, and the loss of one million war 
production hours.113 Black belligerents undeniably fought back as fiercely as their white 
counterparts.114 Nevertheless, they suffered disproportionate casualties. Of the thirty-four 
who died, twenty-five were African American. Out of these, the police were responsible 
for seventeen.115 James criticized the policemen for firing their weapons, but he 
condemned more vehemently the Roosevelt Administration: 
By the government’s action over the Sojourner Truth riots, by its refusal to take 
one single step to avert a crisis which everybody, and particularly the police, 
knew was on the way, the government had given the police a clear direction as to 
where the guns were to be pointed.116  
Sugrue’s analysis largely vindicates James. Pointing out that the Detroit Housing 
Commission perpetuated segregation in public housing following the Sojourner Truth 
riot, Sugrue concludes that “white community groups learned to use the threat of 
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imminent violence as a political tool to gain leverage in housing debates.”117 The 
government had genuflected before—however briefly—in the face of violent threats 
made by angry white Detroiters. Having set this precedent, why would it not do so again? 
Moreover, for those who, like James, believed that the capitalist class who systemically 
attempted to divide and conquer the lower classes, the government’s decision to allow the 
violence between white and black Detroiters to flare for three days without intervention 
only exacerbated this suspicion.  
While James deplored the government’s response to the 1943 riot, he did not find 
African American participation in the riot reprehensible. Blacks had finally refused to 
submit before whites’ racial antagonism. Where Randolph and White had, in James’ 
view, proven weak and conciliatory, black Detroiters were courageous. Calling “his 
political line…impeccable,” James quoted an address given by Reverend Reverdy 
Ransom at the African Methodist Episcopal Church in New York two weeks before the 
Detroit riot: “I am tired of lying and compromising; we praise William Lloyd Garrison – 
he was a white man who died for the Negro – but Negroes must learn to die for 
themselves!”118 It seemed that gradualism had gotten African Americans nowhere. They 
remained segregated in the military; the efficacy of the Fair Employment Practices 
Commission—FDR’s main concession in his 1941 meeting with Randolph—was 
inconsistent; and police across the U.S. continued to arrest African Americans 
disproportionally compared to whites. Furthermore, violence was embedded in Marxism-
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Leninism’s DNA. James’ foremost political model, Vladimir Lenin, had written in the 
midst of the Russian Civil War: “Marxists have never forgotten that violence must 
inevitably accompany the collapse of capitalism in its entirety and the birth of socialist 
society.”119 
Most important, however, the blatantly unjust system of control and adjudication 
would continue to push African Americans into the vanguard. Housing systems, both 
public and private were not excluding white workers. The police were not 
disproportionately arresting and killing white workers. The municipal and federal 
governments were not neglecting to intervene on behalf of white workers. This applied 
predominantly to blacks, and therefore it was up to them to overthrow the system that 
continued to oppress them. “If Negroes,” James wrote,  
depend upon the government, they are going to be dragged from trolleys and 
beaten up, they and their wives and children will be shot down by rioters and 
police, and their homes will be wrecked and burned. Furthermore, these riots are 
no passing phase. It even by some miracle they are held in check during the war, 
when the war is over they will burst forth with tenfold intensity.120 
The time had come to cease depending on the government. No one understood this better 
than black Americans, and thus they were in the best position to overthrow American 
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Consciousness and Spontaneity 
As late as 1946, James continued to hold the CIO and the UAW in high esteem, 
despite occasional inconsistencies in their promise of equal assimilation of African 
Americans into the labor movement. Charged with counterbalancing the Goliaths that 
were the Ford Motor Company and General Motors, the UAW was especially important 
to the labor landscape in Detroit during the war. For this reason, James was intent on 
dispelling any fears among African Americans that the racially-based violence of the 
1943 riots proved that all whites hated blacks. Following the riots, he wrote:  
Some of these cowards and hangers-on to the Roosevelt government whisper that 
‘we Negroes cannot fight the whole white population.’ The statement is a gross 
slander against tens of millions of white people in America and, above all, a 
slander against the CIO.121 
Perpetuating this racial division within the working class was exactly what the capitalist 
race-baiters wanted, and James refused to grant them their pernicious wish. Furthermore, 
the CIO had proven itself a largely faithful ally to black workers for nearly a decade. 
James was not blind to the occasional instances of racial antagonism within the CIO, but 
the organization was a haven of solidarity much more often than not.122 Moreover, James 
knew that black workers would not be able to carry out a large-scale revolution without 
the assistance of a robust, national labor force like the CIO. They were in the 
revolutionary forefront, but primarily as a spontaneous segment. An organized coalition 
was also required to give structure to their deep, but presumably disorganized 
revolutionary energy. “The Negro activity,” James wrote in 1945, “will have only 
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incidental and unsatisfactory results if it does not finally stimulate the labor movement to 
enter into the struggle without reservations on all fronts.”123 In a sense, by 1945, the CIO 
was as close to a Bolshevik Party equivalent as the United States had thus far seen. Just 
as the Bolshevik Party had been necessary to the 1917 Revolution, because it was capable 
of absorbing the masses’ energy and releasing it in a concerted way, the CIO was also 
vital to the socialist movement in America for similar reasons. Organization, in James’ 
view, was crucial to the success of the working class.   
At the same time, James started to call for the creation of a Labor Party. Although 
he did not really explain why, all of a sudden, a new party distinct from the Workers 
Party was favorable—and even necessary—he had hinted at the reason two years earlier. 
Reflecting on the Bolshevik Party’s success in 1917, James concluded that it was  
Rooted in the economic and social life, history and traditions of the nation. Its 
own class ideology is cast in the national mold and is an integral part of the 
national social structure…The Workers Party is not that. It is a long, long way 
from that.124 
This still does not illuminate the role that the Workers Party was to play in James’ 
revolutionary program. In that same essay, he wrote—conveniently for him, and 
unfortunately for us—that the articulation of this task was imminent.125 The fact, 
however, that he believed there was a large political void to be filled by an independent 
Labor Party suggests that James understood how marginal the Workers Party was—and 
would continue to be. It would take care of socialist theory, which James saw as no small 
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task. He knew without a doubt, however, that this was insufficient for a truly 
revolutionary party. Therefore, the most prudent action that the black proletariat could 
take would be to “declare for a Labor Party and a workers’ government to be formed by 
organized labor.”126 
 This explains, at least in part, why much scholarship has asserted James’ 
abandonment of the vanguard party. This is true insofar as James did not see the Workers 
Party as an equivalent to the Bolshevik Party. He did, however, grasp the crucial nature 
of an organized, robust, working class party that was capable of assimilating the most 
oppressed, spontaneous, and therefore revolutionary masses. 
 
Losing Faith in the UAW 
Towards the end of the decade, James’ impressions of the UAW finally began to 
sour. Any faith James initially had in the union’s ability to lead the working class to 
revolution had all but dissipated. As late as 1943, following the riots, he had seen Walter 
Reuther—and to a lesser extent, his boss, R.J. Thomas—as powerful allies for black 
workers.127 Nevertheless, by the latter half of the decade, James had become increasingly 
critical of Reuther’s tenure. 
In 1946, Walter Reuther defeated the UAW’s former president R.J. Thomas to 
become the union’s new leader, a transition James should have welcomed based on his 
earlier perceptions of the two men. From James’ perspective, however, Reuther was 
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allowing the UAW to degenerate into a toxic bureaucracy, which resulted in a feebler 
negotiating force between the workers and the industrialists.  
Shortly after he assumed the UAW’s presidency, for example, Reuther failed to 
secure an anti-discrimination clause in the workers’ contract with General Motors. At the 
time, onlookers like George Crockett, who led the union’s Fair Practices Department, 
thought Reuther had not been relentless enough on this point in his negotiations with 
GM. His union colleagues were not alone in their dismay. Black workers felt a palpable 
neglect on Reuther’s part to advocate on their behalf.128 Charles Denby, a black UAW 
member, recalled:  
In the early days there was rarely a meeting that didn’t mention something about 
our Negro brothers and sisters…Now, there is no such thing as our union leader 
bringing a problem facing our Negro brothers and sisters before the members as a 
whole to be discussed.129 
What had enervated the UAW to the point that it no longer fought as vigorously for black 
workers as it had promised to do in 1941? There is no definitive answer to this, but James 
diagnosed a deeper problem within the union, of which its weakened support for African 
Americans may have been a symptom.  
In State Capitalism and World Revolution, James, along with his colleagues Raya 
Dunayevskaya and Grace Lee, argued that because the CIO had not yet carried out its 
revolutionary potential, the proletariat risked forfeiting the clout it had begun to amass in 
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the 1930s. Due, in part, to the kind of bureaucratization that was swelling in the UAW, 
workers had once again lost their momentum. “The bureaucracy,” they wrote, 
inevitably must substitute the struggle over consumption, higher wages, pensions, 
education, etc., for a struggle in production. This is the basis of the welfare state, 
the attempt to appease the workers with the fruit of labor when they seek the 
satisfaction in the work itself.130 
The subordination of “the satisfaction of work” to the “fruit of labor,” in other words, 
serves to numb the proletariat’s revolutionary fervor. James’ argument has its roots 
faithfully and firmly planted in Marx. In his “Address of the Central Committee to the 
Communist League,” the German theoretician affirmed that, by negotiating primarily for 
welfare measures, the petty bourgeois hopes “to bribe the workers with a more or less 
disguised form of alms and the break their revolutionary strength by temporarily 
rendering their situation tolerable.” The true revolutionary’s aim, Marx asserted, was not 
merely to “improve the existing society but to found a new one.”131 Even if Reuther might 
have argued that the UAW’s and the CIO’s tactics were slowly revolutionizing the 
United States, James had already shown that he was not interested in gradual change.  
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(From Left to Right: Grace Lee, C.L.R. James, Raya Dunayevskaya [undated]; 
C.L.R. James Papers, Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Collections) 
 
 
Even so, their assessment of the UAW’s decline was not entirely fair. Beginning 
in 1945, Reuther attempted to extract a deal from General Motors that would have forced 
them to open their books and increase workers’ wages by 30 percent. Because GM 
received tax deductions from the government in the event of a strike, it could afford to 
withstand a workers’ strike, and therefore had significant negotiating leverage. Even in 
spite of this, Reuther eventually forced a raise of 18.5 cents/hour, overtime pay, a more 
robust seniority clause, and paid vacations. He and GM negotiated an additional wage 
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provision in 1948 that accounted for cost of living adjustment. Reuther was not, after all, 
entirely impotent—but nor was he a revolutionary.132  
It was Walter Reuther’s apparent capitulation in 1949 that most disturbed James. 
By this time, the Cold War had begun to occupy James’ thoughts. The spread of 
Stalinism, he believed, threatened the American working class as much as it threatened 
American capital, but “that makes for no solidarity between American capital and 
American labor on this issue.”133 Were the Soviet Union to defeat overcome the U.S., it 
would only subjugate the American working class for its own imperialist aims. The 
spread of American capitalism was hardly preferable. This made it all the more important 
for American workers to maintain their strength and opposition to both oppressive 
regimes. “Don’t be deceived or bought off,” James wrote in 1949, “by the picayune 
concessions and hypocritical gestures being made by the American capitalists so that they 
can have a free hand for the cold war abroad.”134 
In negotiations with Ford Motor Company representatives, Walter Reuther 
secured a more generous pension clause in the workers’ contract. What he had neglected 
to address, however, were the workers’ right to strike and labor standards. He had not 
made any effort to reverse the institutional damage done by the Taft-Hartley Act to labor. 
Instead, he was reinforcing the capitalist system by focusing on the least systemic 
concessions like pensions.135 James compared the bureaucratization that followed from 
FMC’s dominance to the bureaucratization that Stalin had nurtured in the Soviet Union. 
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He concluded that the “Stalinist bureaucracy is the American bureaucracy carried to its 
ultimate and logical conclusion, both of them products of capitalist production in the 
epoch of state-capitalism.”136 
Trotsky had also deplored the kind of bureaucracy that Stalin embedded in the 
Soviet Union. First, it stunted the revolutionary progress made by the Bolsheviks. 
Second, and more important, it was “characterized by the suppression of the proletarian 
vanguard and the smashing of revolutionary internationalists.”137 This illuminates Charles 
Denby’s claim that the UAW no longer sought to address black workers’ grievances as it 
once had. Using Trotsky’s framework, the UAW adopted the Stalinist bureaucracy, 
which hindered the black workers, who represented the spontaneous proletarian 
vanguard.  
 
The Path of the Black Vanguard 
By 1948, James had arrived at an important conclusion, one which has shaped 
much of the scholarship that addresses his ideas regarding organization. In his address to 
the Thirteenth Convention of the Socialist Workers Party, James declared:  
We say, number 2, that this independent Negro movement is able to intervene 
with terrific force upon the general social and political life of the nation, despite 
the face that it is waged under the banner of democratic rights, and is not led 
necessarily either by the organized labor movement or the Marxist party.138 
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This seems to contradict his 1945 statement that black workers would not successfully 
overcome capitalist oppression if they failed to join forces with organized labor.139 One 
cannot help but infer that this evolution in thought derives from James’ disappointment in 
the UAW. Now that the union had proven itself too timid in its revolutionary progress, 
James saw no other alternative but to promote the forward motion of African Americans, 
regardless of whether or not this meant leaving organized labor behind. The latter would 
simply have to catch up. James proceeded, however, to add a crucial supplementary 
notion to this, one which, it seems, pundits have paid less attention to. Considering the 
relationship between African Americans and organized labor in Detroit during the war, 
James said, 
If we can reflect on that, if we can constantly be on the alert to see these 
possibilities, the leadership, the fundamental leadership that organized labor can 
give to the Negro movement, the basic dependence of the Negro movement upon 
organized labor; but we can at the same time see the kind of leadership, the kind 
of stimulus, the kind of impetus, the kind of anticipation that the Negro movement 
can give to organized labor, then we shall be able to deal with all problems, not 
only the general problems outside, but the specific problems that the party will 
have to face.140  
 
How, in James’ view, was the black worker supposed to move forward despite the 
lagging behind of bureaucratized labor? In American Civilization, he surprisingly 
neglected to prescribe any course of action for the black proletariat. In an 
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uncharacteristically staid reflection, he concluded that African Americans had already 
done much to change the American landscape. Notwithstanding this ultimate analysis, 
devoid of his typically polemical flair, his application of Marxism-Leninism to the black 
struggle did not subside in his last American years. James still believed that African 
Americans occupied strong position in the vanguard. In his 1949 essay “Road Ahead for 
the Negro Struggle,” James argued that by taking on accommodationists and joining 
forces with other workers, African Americans “can have a great future before them…and 
best of all, they can stimulate the proletariat to enter upon the scene once more and 
resume the struggle on a far higher plane than in the great days of the CIO to which we 
referred earlier.”141 How could they do this? Like many Marxist theoreticians before him, 
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Conclusion 
 
“One of my most important and pregnant experiences is my experience both personal and otherwise of 
West Indians and people of West Indian origin who have made their way on the broad stage of Western 
civilization…One of the tasks I have set myself is to make people understand what these men have done 
and their significance in world politics. In a substantial respect I am one of them, although I have not 
played the concrete role that they have played: I say that I am one of them because it means that I 
understand the type very well. And you are one.” 
 —C.L.R. James to Stokely Carmichael, 1967 
 
In the fall of 1953, following his arrest for “passport violations” and a rejected 
application for citizenship, C.L.R. James was forced to leave the United States. He used 
the time between his arrest and his deportation to reflect on the totalitarian similarities 
between Captain Ahab and Joseph Stalin, the sum of which he published in Mariners, 
Renegades and Castaways. He would later claim—surely in his typical, biting tone—that 
“Anyone who understands Herman Melville’s Moby Dick cannot be considered un-
American.” Apparently, the United States government did not agree.142     
In 1968, James was finally allowed to reenter the U.S., and he must have realized 
the irony that this year, together with 1953, bracketed what is arguably the height of 
black mobilization in American history. Still, if James was bitter that he missed the 
proliferation of civil rights victories and black radical groups, he did not show it. When 
he returned, he seemed content simply to, once again, insinuate himself among small, 
black radical groups and to lecture at universities across the country.143  
One of these groups owed its existence largely—albeit indirectly—to James. 
Based in Detroit, the League of Revolutionary Black Workers consisted of African 
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American auto workers, many of whom had read James’ work and moved in the same 
circles as his disciples Grace Lee Boggs and Martin Glaberman. As early as 1974, 
Kimathi Mohammed, a black radical from Detroit, wrote: “Even though the national 
impact of the Black Panther Party was much greater than the League’s impact, the 
potential of the League was much greater than the Panther’s potential.” The League’s 
members, as auto workers, did not have to resort to “militaristic intimidation,” but could 
instead employ what Kimathi deemed the “most powerful weapon” available to black 
workers: the strike.144   
Although he seemed to direct his critique at the militant tactics of Black Power 
groups, Mohammed repeatedly suggested that there was another, more substantial 
obstacle that hindered their nationwide success. Citing Huey Newton’s desire to turn the 
Black Panthers into a “vanguard party,” Mohammad noted that  
instead of moving away from the notion of building a Marxist-Leninist Party, the 
Black Panthers  sunk deeper into it. After memorizing these clichés, these up-
starts went in the Black Panther Party went around quoting Marx and Lenin 
without understanding Marxist-Leninism, particularly its application to the Black 
movement in the United States.145 
The strength of black movements, Kimathi argued, lay in their spontaneity and once they 
began to replace this with a centralized organization—which he asserted was inextricably 
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bound to a “party ‘line’”—they were doomed to fail. For this reason, Kimathi resented 
what he believed was the legacy of the Leninist vanguard.146  
 James believed that the Black Power movement was flawed, but for different 
reasons. He did not agree, for example, with the notion put forward by his compatriot 
Stokely Carmichael that black radicals could not work directly with the white working 
class.147 In spite of this, James, reflecting on Carmichael in 1967, would proclaim that 
[Black Power] represents the high peak of thought on the Negro question which 
has been going on for over half a century…The kind of impact the Negroes are 
making is due to the fact that they constitute a vanguard not only to the Third 
World, but constitute also that section of the United States which is most 
politically advanced.148 
When James, over the course of his first decade in the U.S., repeatedly used the 
“vanguard” to describe black Americans’ role in the overthrow of capitalism, he had a 
different definition in mind than Kimathi’s. This definition, furthermore, remained 
aligned with one of Lenin’s two principal notions of the vanguard, for despite the 
conclusions of Kimathi and other pundits, even the father of the Russian Revolution did 
not subscribe to a rigid, singular view of the vanguard. Instead, as the Indian political 
scientist Achin Vanaik persuasively argues, Lenin’s “vanguard” was polysemous. On one 
hand, it referred to the Party that would be responsible for educating the masses of 
workers. On the other, it signified the most advanced section of the workers 
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themselves.149 In 1919, for example, Lenin wrote, “The Bolsheviks were victorious, first 
of all, because they had behind them the vast majority of the proletariat, which included 
the most class-conscious, energetic and revolutionary section, the real vanguard, of that 
class.”150 The vanguard, for Lenin, described both the most organized and the most 
spontaneous elements of the revolutionary movement, and while he argued that the 
second occupied a subordinate role to the first, the two would nevertheless galvanize one 
another.  
Following his departure from the U.S. in 1953, James felt compelled to address 
the legacy of a centralized, top-down party in Marxism-Leninism. Although he had never 
used the term in this way, for many disillusioned heirs of Leninism, the vanguard had 
come to represent the elitism that characterized the Bolshevik Party following the 
October Revolution. In 1963, James wrote,  
The theory and practice of the vanguard party, of the one-party state, is not (repeat 
not) the central doctrine of Leninism. It is not the central doctrine, it is not even a 
special doctrine. It is not and it never was. In forty years it would be as easy to 
prove (and be equally wrong) that the United States of Europe had always been 
the central doctrine, or became a special doctrine, of the Tory party.151 
Regardless of the extent to which this is revisionist, it is evident that James was not 
interested in a rigid, top-down vanguard party.152 He never had been. Even as early as 
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1944, he did not see the Workers Party as an American equivalent to the Bolshevik Party, 
and was content to watch from the sidelines as African Americans and members of the 
CIO led the proletariat forward. He did, however, seize the other notion of the 
“vanguard” that Lenin bequeathed to those among his heirs who still believed that some 
segments of the working class were more capable of igniting a revolutionary spark than 
others. For James, this would be comprised of African Americans, and especially the 
black proletariat.   
James, like the Black Power movement, stood opposite a government which was 
not ready for radical ideas, and which had the force necessary to crush them. It is possible 
that even had James produced immaculately clear and consistent revolutionary theory he 
would have been suppressed by a larger American public, which has thus far proven itself 
opposed to change that is not gradual. Nevertheless, part of his inability to move 
American masses toward socialism can, without a doubt, be attributed to his own flaws. 
First, even before he arrived in America, he had failed to secure a visa that lasted longer 
than six months—and he failed to extend it. In the increasingly rabid anti-Communist 
politics—that seemed to catch in its net all iterations of Marxism—he would be forced to 
go underground or else face deportation. This was problematic for someone who was, it 
seems, a more convincing speaker than writer. Moreover, even though he did write 
several incisive critiques of American capitalism, there remained two problems. First, he 
was often inconsistent and abstract. His deductions often rested on assumptions, which 
were unclear, and which he did not care to thoroughly explain. It should go without 
saying that the most successful intellectuals are those who can explain their ideas clearly. 
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Second, he wrote for a series of small socialist publications, and he never published a 
work in America on par with The Souls of Black Folk or The Fire Next Time. Instead, he 
decided to pursue an lengthy, obscure analysis of Hegel. James was, it seems, content to 
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